Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life after Criterion A by Brewin, C R et al.
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2009
Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life after Criterion A
Brewin, C R; Lanius, R A; Novac, A; Schnyder, U; Galea, S
Brewin, C R; Lanius, R A; Novac, A; Schnyder, U; Galea, S (2009). Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life after
Criterion A. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 22(5):366-373.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Traumatic Stress 2009, 22(5):366-373.
Brewin, C R; Lanius, R A; Novac, A; Schnyder, U; Galea, S (2009). Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life after
Criterion A. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 22(5):366-373.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Traumatic Stress 2009, 22(5):366-373.
Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V: Life after Criterion A
Abstract
The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder has been criticized on numerous grounds, but principally
for three reasons (a) the alleged pathologizing of normal events, (b) the inadequacy of Criterion A, and
(c) symptom overlap with other disorders. The authors review these problems along with arguments
why the diagnosis is nevertheless worth retaining in an amended form. A proposal for the fifth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) is put forward that involves
abolishing Criterion A, narrowing the B criteria to focus on the core phenomena of flashbacks and
nightmares, and narrowing the C and D criteria to reduce overlap with other disorders. The potential
advantages and disadvantages of this formulation are discussed.
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Abstract 
The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder has been criticized on numerous grounds, 
but principally for three reasons (a) the alleged pathologizing of normal events, (b) the 
inadequacy of Criterion A, and (c) symptom overlap with other disorders. We review these 
problems along with arguments why the diagnosis is nevertheless worth retaining in an amended 
form. A proposal for DSM-V is put forward that involves abolishing Criterion A, narrowing the 
B criteria to focus on the core phenomena of flashbacks and nightmares, and narrowing the C 
and D criteria to reduce overlap with other disorders. The potential advantages and disadvantages 
of this formulation are discussed. 
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Despite an enormous increase in knowledge about psychological trauma over the last 30 
years, the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) continues to attract controversy. An 
extreme view, for example, is that it is a “faddish postulate” that has “moved the mental health 
field away from, not toward, understanding the psychological responses to trauma” (McHugh & 
Treisman, 2007, p. 221). In this review we evaluate some of the criticisms of PTSD and conclude 
that it is nevertheless a valuable diagnosis that is worth retaining. Finally, we outline the possible 
advantages of abolishing PTSD Criterion A while simultaneously making the B-D criteria more 
explicit and more stringent.  
PTSD was introduced in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) as a 
“monocausal” mental disorder requiring a recognizable stressor “that would evoke significant 
symptoms of distress in almost everyone” and that was “generally outside the range of usual 
human experience.” The stressor criterion (Criterion A) was subsequently elaborated in DSM-III-
R to give examples of qualifying events (e.g., serious threat to life or physical integrity). A major 
justification for PTSD was the previous assumption that stressful events could only produce 
transitory mental disturbance, meaning that there was no diagnosis available for individuals who 
developed long-lasting psychopathology in response to extreme stress.  
This idea of a disorder that could be explained entirely by an environmental event rather 
than by the characteristics of a person, or their interaction, was in marked contrast to other 
disorders in the DSM and was immediately controversial. It soon became clear, however, that 
traumatic events were much more prevalent than had been assumed, and that typically only a 
minority of individuals developed PTSD afterwards, facts that fundamentally challenged the 
conceptual basis of the disorder (Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995). After almost three decades of 
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research we know that although the nature of the stressor and its intensity is important, PTSD has 
a multifactorial etiology (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000).  
Evaluation of Three Criticisms of PTSD 
Criticism 1: PTSD Pathologizes Normal Distress 
One repeated criticism of PTSD has been that it creates a medical condition out of normal 
distress (McHugh & Treisman, 2007; Summerfield, 2001). This is a complex claim and can be 
taken in at least three different ways. One is that reactions to extreme stress are time-limited, and 
that PTSD symptoms will resolve naturally of their own accord with no lasting harm to the 
person. Another possible meaning of the claim is that the “symptoms” of PTSD are ubiquitous 
reactions to stressful events found in people suffering from normal distress. A final meaning is 
that PTSD is not biologically distinguishable from normal distress. 
The claim that reactions to extreme stress are time-limited, and that PTSD symptoms will 
resolve naturally of their own accord with no lasting harm to the person was the received view 
prior to DSM-III. Epidemiological studies refute these assertions, and show that extreme stress 
sometimes leads to severe and long-lasting psychopathology (e.g., Norris & Slone, 2007), as well 
as to a variety of serious medical conditions (Schnurr & Green, 2004). A follow-up of children 
who were aged 4 to 11 when they survived the Aberfan disaster in 1966 showed that one third 
still suffered from PTSD 33 years later (Morgan, Scourfield, Williams, Jasper, & Lewis, 2003). 
Studies of terrorist attacks similarly distinguish between largely short-term symptomatic 
reactions in the population who are not directly involved versus long-term disorder in direct 
victims (Neria, Nandi, & Galea, 2008; Whalley & Brewin, 2007). 
A popular view currently is that PTSD reflects a failure of adaptation, whereby normal 
reactions to extreme stress do not correct themselves (e.g., Brewin, 2003; Shalev, 2003). Thus, 
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what is pathological about PTSD is defined not by the nature but by the persistence of its 
symptoms. Critics who claim PTSD is nothing but normal distress should be obliged to state how 
long symptoms can last or how much impairment can be tolerated before it is unreasonable still 
to regard them as “normal.” This they have yet to do. 
Increasing evidence also supports a distinctive biological profile associated with PTSD. 
A recent meta-analysis examined functional neuroimaging of emotion processing in several 
anxiety disorders and identified unique patterns of activation in PTSD compared to social 
anxiety disorder and specific phobia (Etkin & Wager, 2007). Other studies have found distinct 
patterns of neural activation in PTSD patients as compared to depressed patients (Whalley, 
Rugg, Smith, Dolan, & Brewin, 2009), and in PTSD patients with and without comorbid 
depression (Kemp et al., 2007; Lanius et al., 2007). There is also evidence suggesting distinctive 
patterns of cortisol negative feedback inhibition in PTSD versus depression (Yehuda, Halligan, 
Golier, Grossman, & Bierer, 2004). 
Criticism 2: Inadequacy of Criterion A 
Much of the criticism directed at PTSD has focused on the A Criterion. In their review 
Weathers and Keane (2007) identified three fundamental issues: How broadly or narrowly 
should trauma be defined? Can trauma be measured reliably and validly? What is the relationship 
between trauma and PTSD? In this article we focus primarily on their first and last questions, 
reviewing evidence that trauma is not exclusively associated with PTSD, that Criterion A is 
insufficiently specific (i.e., too broad), and conversely that it is excessively specific (i.e., too 
narrow). 
Other disorders are linked to traumatic (Criterion A) events. The existence of the stressor 
criterion implies a unique relationship between trauma and PTSD. In fact trauma is associated 
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with an increased prevalence of other disorders, most commonly depression, generalized anxiety 
disorder, panic disorder, and increased substance use (Fullerton & Ursano, 2005). There may 
also be adjustment disorders, agoraphobia, and specific phobias related to the type of incident 
(e.g., Handley, Salkovskis, Scragg, & Ehlers, in press; Gabriel et al., 2007). If other disorders 
can be successfully diagnosed after a traumatic event, the question arises why the same could not 
be true of PTSD.  
 Although disorders other than PTSD are linked to Criterion A events, there is 
considerable evidence that these events do not increase the risk for other disorders independently 
of the increased risk for PTSD. For example, Breslau, Davis, Peterson, and Schultz (2000) 
showed that that there was an increased risk for depression in respondents who had also 
developed PTSD, but no increased risk in respondents who were exposed to trauma without 
developing PTSD. As noted by Breslau et al., similar findings have been obtained for substance 
use and anxiety disorders, suggesting that PTSD does indeed play a central role in the 
psychological response to trauma. 
Insufficient specificity of Criterion A.  The original conceptualization of PTSD as a 
response to an event “generally outside the range of usual human experience” was broadened 
when it was realized that the prevalence of traumatic events was higher than had been supposed. 
In the DSM-IV the definition of a traumatic stressor was further broadened in that a person who 
is not personally and directly exposed to trauma but rather learns about someone else being 
traumatized now qualifies as having been exposed to trauma. As a result, critics have charged 
that there is a kind of “conceptual bracket creep” (McNally, 2003) or “criterion creep” (Rosen, 
2004) that is causing PTSD to be diagnosed in response to situations that are far removed from 
the original concept of a trauma.  
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Among the non-Criterion A events that have been reported to produce PTSD symptoms 
are: marital disruption, affairs, and divorce; collapse of adoption arrangements; employment 
related stressors and money problems; bereavement; loss of cattle to foot and mouth disease; 
frightening Halloween television programs; and breaking up with a best friend (Rosen & 
Lilienfeld, 2008). A close inspection of the literature, however, shows very few examples of 
individuals meeting the full diagnostic criteria in these circumstances. Most of the authors cited 
turn out either to have only expressed their own opinions, or have only collected data on a subset 
of PTSD symptoms rather than use a proper clinical interview, or are based on samples of 
children.  
Breslau and Kessler (2001) found that the broadening of the stressor criterion in DSM-IV 
did lead to more cases of PTSD, but that most were attributable to learning about the sudden 
unexpected death of a close relative or friend, an event that could quite reasonably be described 
as traumatic. Other situations where events not clearly meeting the Criterion A threshold are 
sometimes associated with full PTSD involve a build-up of stress over a prolonged period. 
Examples given in the literature include harassment at work, caring for a terminally ill partner, or 
stalking (Pathe & Mullen, 1997; Scott & Stradling, 1994). Prolonged duration stress leading to 
PTSD has also been described in military samples (Breslau & Davis, 1987). 
Several papers in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks documented 
PTSD symptoms not only among residents of affected areas (e.g., Galea et al., 2002), but among 
persons living in geographically distant parts of the US (e.g., Silver et al., 2002). McNally and 
Breslau (2008) referred to these psychological responses as „virtual PTSD“ and suggested that 
they were „normal, temporary distress responses to a shocking event, not medical symptoms 
indicative of psychiatric illness.“ Marshall, Amsel, and Suh (2008) responded by pointing out 
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that two years later persons with acute stress symptoms after 9/11 had almost double the rate of 
new-onset hypertension and more than triple the rate of new-onset heart problems. Moreover, 
persons with ongoing terrorism-related worries had more than a 4.5-fold increase in new-onset 
heart problems (Holman et al., 2008). 
Marshall et al. (2008) also emphasized that trauma of lower intensity would in fact be 
expected to provoke PTSD in vulnerable individuals with a limited capacity to dampen their 
physiological response to stress. Such vulnerability may be genetic (Hariri et al., 2002), 
interacting with lifetime exposure to trauma (Stein, Schork, & Gelernter, 2008), or epigenetic 
(Yehuda, Bell, Bierer, & Schmeidler, 2008). Vulnerability may also be related to greater levels 
of prior trauma (Williams et al., 2007). Both subjective distress and complexity of symptoms, 
including comorbidity, may be considered as separate indicators of vulnerability to trauma and 
stress (Novac & Hubert-Schneider, 1998). Thus the fact that some events associated with PTSD 
may appear “insufficient” for Criterion A is only surprising if, as in DSM-IV, no allowance is 
made for variability in enduring stress reactivity.  
Excessive specificity of Criterion A. In 1994 DSM-IV introduced a two-part stressor 
criterion for adults (the criteria for children are slightly different). To qualify for a PTSD 
diagnosis, individuals had not only to have experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with a 
qualifying event (Criterion A1), but to have responded with intense fear, helplessness, or horror 
(Criterion A2). This subjective element to the trauma response was introduced despite evidence 
from the DSM-IV Field Trial (Kilpatrick et al., 1998) that there are a wide range of reactions to 
trauma associated with PTSD, including shame, a sense of violation of trust, emotional numbing 
etc. Consistent with their findings, other studies have identified cases in which trauma exposure 
is not accompanied by A2 responses although the full PTSD syndrome develops. For example, 
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military personnel are trained to deal with traumatic situations, and report A2 responses less 
often (Adler, Wright, Bliese, Eckford, & Hoge, 2008; Breslau & Kessler, 2001). Among civilian 
victims of violent crime a small number had sufficient symptoms for PTSD in the absence of 
Criterion A2; they reported other intense emotions such as shame or anger instead (Brewin, 
Andrews, & Rose, 2000). Survivors with traumatic brain injury may also go on to develop PTSD 
despite losing consciousness and being unable to report A2 responses (Harvey, Kopelman, & 
Brewin, 2005).  
The fact that some individuals develop the complete syndrome without describing intense 
fear, helplessness, or horror at the time of the trauma is only surprising if, as in DSM-IV, it is 
assumed that the original emotions remain stable over time. Psychological and biological 
knowledge are, however, more consistent with the idea that memories, and the emotions 
associated with them, can and do sometimes change (Brewin, 2003; McNally, 2003).  
Criticism 3: Symptom Overlap with Other Disorders 
The symptom overlap with depression and other anxiety disorders has been frequently 
noted as a potential problem with the PTSD diagnosis (e.g., Brewin, 2003; McHugh & Treisman, 
2007; Spitzer, First, & Wakefield, 2007). Symptom B1 refers to any kind of intrusive memory, 
image, or thought, a symptom that is common to many psychiatric disorders. Patients who 
ruminate in the absence of any intrusive memory would therefore currently qualify for Criterion 
B, even though most clinicians would regard this as more characteristic of depression than 
PTSD. Emotional and physiological arousal elicited by specific situations, and avoidance of 
those situations, are part of phobias. Phobic patients would meet Criterion B by virtue of 
endorsing B4 and B5, without any of the reexperiencing normally associated with PTSD. Social 
withdrawal, loss of interest, emotional numbing, and hopelessness about the future are all 
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common features of depression. Sleeplessness, irritability, and concentration problems are found 
in both depression and in generalized anxiety disorder, which can also be accompanied by 
exaggerated startle. This lack of specificity is of particular concern because there are so many 
different combinations of symptoms that will all yield a diagnosis of PTSD. 
A confirmatory factor analysis by Simms, Watson, and Doebbeling (2002) found that 
PTSD symptoms fell into reexperiencing, avoidance, dysphoria, and hyperarousal clusters. 
Although one other 4-factor solution provides a good fit to the data, Simms et al.’s model has 
received most support to date (Palmieri, Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007). Simms et al. found 
that the symptoms that overlap most with depression (C4-C7 and D1-D3) did indeed reflect a 
general dysphoria factor rather than being specific to PTSD. Breslau and Kessler (2001) found 
that the increase in PTSD rates attributable to the broadening of Criterion A1 in DSM-IV 
occurred mainly because of events consisting of learning of unexpected injury to or the death of 
a close friend or loved one. These events are as likely to have induced sadness and grief as fear 
or horror. It is possible therefore that it is related conditions such as depression, also 
characterized by intrusive memories and general symptoms of dysphoria, that account for the 
apparent increase in PTSD rates that has been reported with the broadening of Criterion A1.  
Two reexperiencing symptoms that do appear to be distinctive to PTSD are flashbacks 
and traumatic nightmares. Clinical descriptions of PTSD emphasize the importance of 
flashbacks, powerful multi-sensory image-based memories triggered by reminders in which 
traumatic events are reexperienced in the present rather than in the past (Brewin, 2003; Ehlers, 
Hackmann, & Michael, 2004). In flashbacks the recall of traumatic images appears to be 
disconnected from contextual information that normally associates a sensory memory with 
awareness of a corresponding time and place. They can vary from relatively mild (there is a 
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transient sense of the event reoccurring in the present) to extreme (the person loses all 
connection with their current autobiographical self and present surroundings while 
reexperiencing the memory). An emerging literature documents that flashbacks are specific to 
PTSD rather than mere trauma exposure (Brewin, 2007), that they distinguish PTSD from 
depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998) and that, relative to intrusive memories in depression, 
intrusive memories in PTSD involve a greater sense of reliving in the present (Birrer et al., 
2007). Flashbacks appear to be a particularly sensitive and specific indicator of PTSD (Duke, 
Allen, Rozee, & Bommaritto, 2008), and their characteristic features are predictive of the course 
of the disorder (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).  
 Posttraumatic nightmares are another common distinctive feature of PTSD, occurring in 
up to 70% of sufferers (Harvey, Jones, & Schmidt, 2003; Lamarche & De Koninck, 2007). 
Although other anxiety disorders are associated with sleep disturbance, they differ in their 
specific phenomenological characteristics (e.g., Sheikh, Woodward, & Leskin, 2003). It is of 
interest that a similar intervention, imagery rehearsal and rescripting, has been used specifically 
to treat nightmares as well as to treat PTSD symptoms more generally (Lamarche & De Koninck, 
2007). 
Improving the Diagnosis of PTSD 
 We propose that the way forward for the PTSD diagnosis is to abolish Criterion A and 
refocus PTSD around a smaller set of core symptoms. First, why abolish Criterion A? Previously 
in this article we have described the criticisms PTSD has faced for including etiology in its 
criteria, and the practical difficulties in defining Criterion A in such a way as to include all 
relevant cases but exclude inappropriate ones. Criterion A has now gone through three iterations, 
and we regard it as highly unlikely that any formulation for Criterion A will be found that deals 
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with all the problems and inconsistencies that have been identified. Moreover, the evidence we 
have reviewed on individual differences in sensitization and vulnerability clearly suggest that 
specifying triggering events is not just difficult, but undesirable. An individual’s symptomatic 
profile will always be shaped by their genetics, by their environmental history, and by the 
interaction of the two. To imagine that a single triggering event will always outweigh these runs 
contrary to contemporary thinking. 
Criterion A could be weakened until any event would qualify, as is the case for 
adjustment disorder. Like some previous authors, however, we think the criterion would be better 
dispensed with altogether. Solomon and Canino (1990) pointed out that keeping the stressor as 
part of the diagnosis builds in a confound that makes it impossible to assess empirically to what 
class of stressor the symptomatic response of PTSD occurs. In the DSM-IV Field Trial 
(Kilpatrick et al., 1998), altering the definition of Criterion A (including allowing low-magnitude 
events to qualify as triggers for PTSD) had virtually no impact on prevalence rates. In a study of 
tourists affected by the tsunami of December 26, 2004, the value of Criterion A to predict PTSD 
criteria B – D was low so that, based on these findings, the authors regarded Criterion A as 
dispensable (Kraemer, Wittmann, Jenewein, Maier, & Schnyder, in press; see also Bedard-
Gilligan & Zoellner, 2008). The data we have reviewed in this article are consistent in 
demonstrating that, with the exception of some cases arising from stress of prolonged duration, 
the full PTSD syndrome hardly ever occurs in the absence of an event that could reasonably be 
described as traumatic: In other words, Criterion A simply describes the usual context of PTSD 
without contributing itself to diagnostic precision. 
If Criterion A does not assist in making a diagnosis, and the attempt to define it simply 
creates controversy, it is hard to argue that it is worth retaining. Like Maier (2006), we believe 
                                                                                      Reformulating PTSD for DSM-V 
                                                                                                                                         13 
 
that the information provided by Criterion A can be substituted by the presence or absence of a 
set of core symptoms, and that it is possible to omit Criterion A without any loss of accuracy, 
selectivity or validity of the diagnosis of PTSD. Why is this desirable? First, as reviewed above, 
there is abundant evidence that existing symptoms in clusters B-D are commonly reported in 
response to a wide variety of stressful situations, whether traumatic or not. It is also striking that 
other anxiety disorders (e.g., social anxiety, panic disorder, OCD) have far simpler diagnostic 
criteria and generally contain a core defining feature that can be recognized with a high degree of 
reliability. It is an empirical question whether PTSD could be similarly simplified. Consistent 
with this possibility, however, there is evidence that screening measures with as few as 4-6 items 
perform as well as longer instruments containing the full 17 items specified in DSM-IV in 
detecting current PTSD (Brewin, 2005). 
Our proposal is that PTSD should be refocused around the core phenomenon of reexperiencing 
in the present, in the form of intrusive multi-sensory images accompanied by marked fear or 
horror, an event now perceived as having severely threatened a person’s physical or 
psychological wellbeing. The intention is to highlight the features that are most salient to the 
individual with PTSD, that are the primary focus of psychological treatment, and that make 
PTSD distinct from other anxiety disorders and from depression. Images may be visual, auditory, 
olfactory, somatosensory, or a combination of these. The reexperiencing symptoms need to be 
supplemented by other, closely related symptoms that are as far as possible specific to PTSD and 
are less likely to reflect general dysphoria. Thus, the current diagnostic criteria could be amended 
to read as shown in Table 1, involving a reduction from 17 to 6 core symptoms. Five of these 6 
symptoms were found to be among the most highly predictive of a PTSD diagnosis in the DSM-
IV Field Trial (Kilpatrick et al., 1998). 
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These criteria emphasize once more the actual symptoms currently reported by patients 
rather than their accounts of past events, recognizing that the significance of those events may be 
changed by subsequent psychological and biological developments. There is an explicit focus on 
the emotions of fear and horror, recognizing that there are related but probably distinct disorders 
in which intrusive memories and images are accompanied by other emotions such as anger, guilt, 
shame, or sadness, but not by fear or horror. Finally, it is important to emphasize that, like many 
other disorders, PTSD is unlikely to occur in isolation and will typically be comorbid with 
depression, substance abuse, anxiety disorders, more complex dissociative presentations, etc. 
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of the Proposed Diagnostic Criteria 
Abolition of Criterion A 
Among the possible advantages of not requiring a trauma is that PTSD will immediately 
come into alignment with all other psychiatric disorders, and one major source of controversy 
will have been eliminated. PTSD will now be much more comparable with the other anxiety 
disorders and with depression. There will no longer be a problem deciding whether the 
reexperienced event qualifies for Criterion A, or depending on retrospective reports of what 
emotions were felt, and how strongly, many months or years previously. Individual vulnerability, 
professional training to face traumatic events, and changing perceptions of events over time, will 
no longer disqualify individuals from being diagnosed with PTSD. Clinicians will be free to 
focus on the symptomatic presentation and on the most appropriate treatment, free of concerns 
that someone will decide that a survivor of trauma “could not have PTSD” because the events 
lived through were not on a list established by a limited number of studies, or because the “right” 
emotions were not felt at the time. Any risk of a return to the pre-DSM-III state of affairs when 
the treatment needs of individuals with PTSD were not recognized would be minimized. 
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Two objections to abolishing Criterion A were recently articulated by Weathers and 
Keane (2007). One was that it would result in a substantial departure from the original 
conceptualization of PTSD. In our view that conceptualization should now change substantially 
to reflect the wealth of new research findings on risk factors, traumatic memory, etc. It has 
become clear that a traumatic event does not have the etiological status that was originally 
envisaged but that it interacts in a complex way with the individual characteristics of the affected 
person. Their second objection was that it would risk trivializing the suffering of those exposed 
to catastrophic life events. We believe that, unlike in 1980, it is now clearly established that 
traumatic events can have a severe and long-lasting impact on mental health. We anticipate that 
meeting the new criteria for PTSD will continue to be very strongly associated with exposure to 
events meeting the former Criterion A, and that these events will continue to be identifiable 
through the content of the reexperiencing symptoms. Our concern is rather that having the 
etiological criterion places excessive emphasis on PTSD as the primary outcome of catastrophic 
events and impedes recognition of other common outcomes such as depression, phobia, GAD, 
somatoform disorders, substance abuse disorders, etc. 
Another potential objection is that without the ‘gatekeeper’ function of Criterion A the 
scope of PTSD will be widened to include reactions to almost any stressor, and that the diagnosis 
will become meaningless as a result. We believe the existing data suggest this is unlikely to 
occur, and that in any case the accompanying increased focus on core symptoms, together with 
the impairment criterion, will prevent this from happening.  
Focusing on Core Symptoms 
The increased focus on a core disturbance, and the consequent simplification of the 
criteria, should lead to improved ease of identification and diagnosis in settings other than 
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specialist trauma centers. The removal of symptoms associated with general dysphoria should 
also lead to greater homogeneity of cases and reduced overlap with other disorders. In keeping 
with the emphasis on the underlying psychological process, the criteria additionally give 
clinicians greater flexibility in identifying reexperiencing on examination. Highly avoidant 
patients may not have had reexperiencing symptoms in the past month even though they know 
what situations continue to trigger them and the symptoms are readily apparent when they 
describe their trauma. Finally, the explicit focus on the reexperiencing of fear and horror should 
encourage better links with basic psychological and neuroscience approaches to these emotions. 
 One disadvantage of the proposals is that there may be disagreement about what 
constitutes the core of the disorder. North, Suris, Davis, and Smith (2009) have recently 
proposed that the defining features of PTSD are the avoidance and numbing symptoms, partly on 
the grounds that this symptom cluster is less commonly endorsed than the others, and that 
meeting the threshold for these symptoms is more predictive of subsequent disorder than meeting 
criteria for the reexperiencing or hyperarousal symptoms. However, much of the evidence on 
which this argument is based does not distinguish clearly between effortful avoidance and 
emotional numbing, which appear to be distinct dimensions with different underlying 
mechanisms (e.g., Elklit & Shevlin, 2007; Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992; Simms et al., 2002). 
It is important both practically and theoretically to know whether it is numbing, avoidance, or 
both that account for the predictive power of this symptom cluster. Another problem is that the 
numbing symptoms are those that overlap most with depression (Simms et al., 2002), rather than 
being a distinctive characteristic of PTSD.  
Conclusion 
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The controversy over the PTSD diagnosis and the uncertainty over how to frame 
Criterion A have not abated with the passage of time or with increasing knowledge. Critics of 
PTSD have frequently had valid points to make but have less often made constructive 
suggestions for its improvement. We believe the value of the diagnosis itself is clear, but that its 
dependence on the etiological criterion is now more of historical interest rather than practical 
importance. Further, the symptomatic overlap with other disorders has tended to impede research 
into underlying processes, and to obscure links with the psychology and biology of emotion. It 
may also have given a false impression of the degree of comorbidity associated with the disorder. 
We believe that PTSD has now come of age in the sense of being accepted as a distinct and 
important condition with its own range of evidence-based, targeted treatments. In our view it is 
time to consider a reformulation of the diagnosis built on the formidable knowledge base that has 
accrued in the last 30 years.  
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Table 1 
Proposed Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD in DSM-V 
 
Criterion B (Reexperiencing - should be present in past month or, exceptionally, on 
examination). Either: 
(i) recurrent distressing dreams related to an event now perceived as having severely threatened 
someone’s physical or psychological wellbeing, from which the person wakes with marked 
fear or horror, or 
(ii) repeated daytime images related to an event now perceived as having severely threatened 
someone’s physical or psychological wellbeing, experienced as recurring in the present and 
accompanied by marked fear or horror  
 
Criterion C (Avoidance – should be present in past month). Either:  
(i) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, conversations, or internal reminders associated with the 
reexperienced event(s), or  
(ii) efforts to avoid activities, places, people, or external reminders associated with the 
reexperienced event(s) 
 
 Criterion D (Hyperarousal - should be present most days in past month). Either:  
(i) hypervigilance, or  
(ii) exaggerated startle response 
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Criterion E (Duration): Duration of the disturbance is more than 1 month 
 
Criterion F (Impairment): The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning 
 
